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MATEY, Circuit Judge. 
 Mohammed Jabateh served as a rebel commander 
during the Liberian civil war. When his faction lost power, he 
fled to the United States seeking asylum and permanent 
residency. His conduct in Liberia, characterized by brazen 
violence and wanton atrocities, made an honest immigration 
application impossible. So he repeatedly lied to United States 
immigration officials, concealing his crimes and portraying 
himself as a persecuted victim. Jabateh’s ruse succeeded for 
almost twenty years until a jury convicted him of immigration 
fraud and perjury. Now, Jabateh challenges his conviction and 
his sentence. His arguments about the quantity and quality of 




supporting the jury’s findings. And his claims of sentencing 
error ignore the careful and detailed reasoning of the District 
Court.     
Jabateh also argues, for the first time, that the 
Government improperly charged him with making false oral 
statements during an interview with an immigration officer in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1621 and 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a). While 
we find no error in Jabateh’s convictions for perjury under 
§ 1621, his convictions under § 1546(a) are a different matter. 
In every case, of course, “[t]he Constitution gives a criminal 
defendant the right to have a jury determine, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, his guilt of every element of the crime with 
which he is charged.” United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 
522–23 (1995). The statutory text alone defines those 
elements. Here, the text of § 1546(a) criminalizes fraud in 
immigration documents. By contrast, the Government did not 
charge Jabateh with fraud in his immigration documents, only 
with orally lying about those documents. That is a distinction 
unsupported by the ordinary and best reading of § 1546(a), and 
we agree with Jabateh that the Government’s interpretation is 
incorrect.   
But while Jabateh is right, his failure to raise this 
argument at trial significantly alters the scope of our review. 
Given the novelty of the interpretative question, and the lack 
of persuasive, let alone authoritative, guidance, we cannot 
conclude that our reading of § 1546(a) meets the stringent 
standards for reversal for “plain error” the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure require. For that reason, we will affirm his 





I.  BACKGROUND 
We recount only the relevant history, reviewing the 
record evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, 
as we must in an appeal challenging the sufficiency of the 
evidence. United States v. Caraballo–Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 
418, 430 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc). 
A.  Jabateh and the Liberian Civil War 
Civil war brought brutal violence to Liberia. In 1989, 
Charles Taylor’s rebel group, the National Patriotic Front of 
Liberia (NPFL), invaded Liberia to overthrow Liberia’s 
president, Samuel Doe. The violence fractured not only Liberia 
but the rebels themselves. NPFL soon split into two factions: 
the NPFL led by Taylor, and the Independent National 
Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) led by Prince Johnson.1 In 
1990, Johnson captured and executed President Doe, triggering 
even more violence.2 New rebel factions entered the fray to 
oppose the NPFL, including the United Liberation Movement 
of Liberia (ULIMO), founded by ethnic Mandingos and 
Krahns, groups targeted by the NPFL.3 Tensions within 
ULIMO eventually swelled, causing a split along 
ethno-religious lines into new warring factions. Islamic 
Mandingo fighters followed Alhaji Kromah, a member of 
former President Doe’s cabinet, to form ULIMO-K (for 
 
1 Luca Renda, Ending Civil Wars: The Case of Liberia, 
23-Fall Fletcher F. World Aff. 59, 61 (1999).  
2 Id. 




Kromah), while Christian Krahn fighters joined Roosevelt 
Johnson to form ULIMO-J (for Johnson).4  
One of Kromah’s ULIMO commanders was 
Mohammed Jabateh, who fought under the nom de guerre 
“General Jungle Jabbah” or “Jungle Jabbah.”5 During the 
height of the civil war, from 1992 through 1995, Jabateh led 
ULIMO’s Zebra Battalion at the frontlines of the conflict in 
Western Liberia. Under Jabateh’s command, fighters 
brutalized prisoners of war and civilians alike. Their crimes 
were breathtaking in their scope and cruelty, including murder, 
rape, torture, ritual cannibalism, and human enslavement. We 
recount only some of the atrocities told at trial to the extent 
relevant to the issues raised on appeal. 
1. Torture 
Jabateh and fighters acting under his direction routinely 
tortured and murdered their adversaries, real or assumed. 
Operating from a territory dubbed “Zero Guard Post,”6 
Jabateh’s militia arrested and then executed anyone suspected 
of “reconnaissance.” (App. at 677.)  Their bodies were then 
simply “throw[n] . . . into the river.” (App. at 678.) Others were 
less fortunate, suffering torture before death. A favorite 
practice of Jabateh’s troops involved “tabay,” binding a 
prisoner’s arms behind the back tight enough to constrict 
breathing. In one instance, Jabateh ordered a child soldier to 
 
4 Id. 
5 Three witnesses at trial identified Jabateh in the 
courtroom as the ULIMO Commander known as Jungle 
Jabbah.   
6 A less than subtle reference, as “[z]ero means [‘]to get 




place tires around two prisoners’ necks, douse the tires in 
gasoline, and set them on fire. As the prisoners screamed in 
agony, Jabateh’s fighters shot them, then left their bodies to 
burn to ashes.  
In another instance, Janghai Barclay testified that she 
fled her home to escape fighting between ULIMO and NPFL, 
only to endure capture by Jabateh’s men. When Jabateh arrived 
to inspect the prisoners, Ms. Barclay watched Jabateh declare 
a captured young man a spy and order him executed. Jabateh’s 
soldiers tied the man to a tree and slit his throat. Jabateh then 
told his soldiers that they could “take” the women for 
themselves and “[w]hen they refuse you can kill them.” (App. 
at 1040.) The soldiers then raped Ms. Barclay, who was eight 
months pregnant, causing her to suffer a miscarriage.  
Or take Hawa Gonoie. She recounted that she was just 
thirteen when Jabateh and his fighters came to her village. 
After Jabateh’s forces captured her family, she witnessed 
Jabateh give the order to kill a suspected spy, remove his heart, 
and feed the organ to Jabateh and his fighters. Conscription 
into ULIMO-K awaited the men, while Jabateh ordered his 
soldiers to “have” the women. (App. at 408.) Jabateh 
“assigned” Ms. Gonoie to an adult soldier who raped her for 
the next month and a half. (App. at 412.)  
2. Persecution 
 The violence rolled on. After ULIMO split along tribal 
lines, Jabateh and his ULIMO-K fighters targeted, tortured, 
and killed members of the Krahn tribe. Around this time, 
ULIMO-K troops attacked a village where Martha Togba lived 
with her sister Tina. During the attack, troops targeted Tina 




Jabateh dragged a pregnant Tina from her home by her hair, 
bleeding from a gunshot wound and half naked, into the street. 
Jabateh beat and stabbed Tina while he interrogated her about 
her boyfriend’s location. When Tina insisted that she did not 
know, Jabateh inserted his gun into Tina’s vagina and fired, 
killing her. Jabateh then ordered a child soldier to guard Tina’s 
body as it lay in the street to ensure that no one moved her until 
her body rotted.  
3. Retribution  
Jabateh quelled opposition with bone-chilling cruelty. 
When residents of one town complained to the Economic 
Community of West African States Monitoring Group 
(“ECOMOG”) after ULIMO-K killed and beat several 
villagers and looted their homes, Jabateh and his troops 
returned to mete out punishment. Soldiers gathered the 
townspeople and pressed them into slavery. For little more than 
sport, Jabateh ordered several villagers, including the village 
chief, executed, and their hearts cut out. Grim acts of 
cannibalism followed.  
The record goes on and on, but we will not. It is enough 
to say without exaggeration that the atrocities documented at 
trial, and found by a jury, paint a portrait of a madman.  
B.  Jabateh Seeks Asylum 
 But though mad, Jabateh was no fool. So when the civil 
war ended with Taylor and the NPFL victorious, and a possible 
reckoning for his crimes loomed, Jabateh left Liberia and 
applied for asylum in the United States. As part of the 




with the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service. 
One question on the Asylum Application asked: 
Have you or any member of your family ever 
belonged to or been associated with any 
organizations or groups in your home country, 
such as, but not limited to, a political party, 
student group, labor union, religious 
organization, military or paramilitary group, 
civil patrol, guerrilla organization, ethnic group, 
human rights group, or the press or media? 
If yes, provide a detailed explanation of your or 
your relatives’ involvement with each group and 
include the name of each organization or group; 
the dates of membership or affiliation; the 
purpose of the organization; your duties or your 
relatives’ duties or responsibilities in the group 
or organization; and whether you or your 
relatives are still active in the group(s). 
(App. at 93.) Jabateh responded “Yes” and referred to the 
attached personal statement. (App. at 93.) In addition, the 
Asylum Application asked:  
Have you, your spouse, or child(ren) ever caused 
harm or suffering to any person because of his or 
her race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group or belief in a particular 
political opinion, or ever ordered, assisted, or 
otherwise participated in such acts? 
(App. at 95.) In response to this question, Jabateh marked “No” 




In the personal statement accompanying his asylum 
application, Jabateh spun a tale that reimagined his role during 
the war and diffidently cast himself as an innocent victim of 
ethnic persecution. He claimed he worked as an intelligence 
officer for ULIMO’s predecessor, and was merely transferred 
into the successor organization. Jabateh painted ULIMO’s 
cause as noble, hoping to “protect Mandingo and Krahn people 
from being murdered and massacred by NPFL forces and to 
bring democracy to Liberia[.]” (App. at 99.) But Jabateh never 
mentioned military combat. Instead, he explained his work as 
largely clerical and administrative, first inside the executive 
headquarters and later as part of the security detail for 
ULIMO’s leader. Then, he explained, when ULIMO’s 
opponents took office, Jabateh and his fellow Mandingo 
colleagues were dismissed. And fearing persecution, he fled to 
the United States. In short, fabrications and falsehoods filled 
his written statements.  
 In 1999, Jabateh met with Nancy Vanlue, a U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) asylum 
officer, for an interview about his application (“1999 
Interview”). At the meeting, Vanlue reviewed Jabateh’s 
written responses in his Asylum Application, and his 
accompanying personal statement. During the interview, 
Vanlue asked Jabateh to confirm his answers, including 
whether he had “ever committed a crime” or “harmed anyone 
else.” (App. at 166, 570–71.) Jabateh was firm, responding 
“no.” Accepting his sworn answers, Vanlue recommended 
Jabateh be granted asylum. Based on his application responses 






C.  Jabateh Seeks Permanent Residency 
 In 2001, Jabateh applied for permanent residency in the 
United States. As before, he filed a written application, this 
time using Form I-485. And once again, his answers ignored 
the truth. Among other questions, Form I-485 asked “[h]ave 
you ever engaged in genocide, or otherwise ordered, incited, 
assisted or otherwise participated in the killing of any person 
because of race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political 
opinion?” and “have you, by fraud or willful misrepresentation 
of a material fact, ever sought to procure, or procured, a visa, 
other documentation, entry into the U.S. or any immigration 
benefit?” (App. at 84.) Jabateh’s answer to both: no.  
Many years later, in 2011,7 USCIS officer Norman De 
Moose interviewed Jabateh under oath about his application 
for permanent residency (“2011 Interview”). De Moose 
reviewed and confirmed Jabateh’s responses in his Form I-485, 
but tailored the interview to focus on the questions “actually 
applicable” to Jabateh. (App. at 603, 628.) De Moose knew the 
Liberian civil war involved “a great number of atrocities” with 
“no clean hands on either side.” (App. at 619.) So while Jabateh 
was still under oath, De Moose asked certain questions from 
Form I-485 verbatim. When he came to question 8 on Form 
I-485, De Moose asked Jabateh: “Have you ever engaged in 
genocide, or otherwise ordered, incited, assisted or otherwise 
 
7 Although Jabateh applied for permanent residency in 
2001, his initial interview occurred in 2007, and another four 
years passed before his follow-up interview in 2011. The 
Government explains this delay as “just a lag in the 
immigration system.” (Oral Arg. Tr. at 50–51.) The accuracy 





participated in the killing of any person because of race, 
religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political opinion?” (App. 
at 84, 635.) Jabateh responded “no.” (App. at 635.) De Moose 
also asked question 10 verbatim, asking “have you, by fraud or 
willful misrepresentation of a material fact, ever sought to 
procure, or procured, a visa, other documentation, entry into 
the U.S. or any immigration benefit?” (App. at 84, 637.) 
Jabateh again answered “no.” (App. at 637.) These false 
answers were critical because, as De Moose explained, 
“somebody who takes up arms and engages in certain wartime 
acts would be inadmissible to the United States.” (App. at 627.)  
D.  Jabateh is Indicted for Fraud 
 Although the wheels of justice sometimes turn slowly, 
they do not turn without purpose. And so, nearly two decades 
after his arrival, a grand jury indicted Jabateh for the fraud in 
his immigration documents in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) 
(Counts One and Two) and perjury in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1621 (Counts Three and Four).8 But the long delay came with 
a cost: all four counts related to Jabateh’s oral statements 
during the 2011 Interview. Recall that Jabateh filed his Form 
I-485 application for permanent residency in 2001, so the 
statute of limitations for any misconduct related to that filing 
had long passed by the time of Jabateh’s indictment in 2016. 
See 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (five-year statute of limitations); 
18 U.S.C. § 3291 (ten-year statute of limitations for certain 
immigration offenses). That left the Government with only 
Jabateh’s oral responses in the 2011 Interview affirming his 
 
8 The Government explained that Jabateh was not 
indicted until 2016 because “[t]he information that proved the 
misconduct here did not come to the Government’s attention 




answer of “no” to the questions related to genocide and prior 
misrepresentations during his immigration applications.  
E. Jabateh’s Conviction  
For those who suffered under Jabateh’s command, the 
two-week jury trial provided a vivid public rebuke from 
seventeen Liberian eyewitnesses whose “demeanor and 
bearing . . . underscored the almost inconceivable horrors and 
indignities they had endured.” (App. at 14.) The District Court 
observed that “[i]t is difficult to convey the force of the 
prosecution’s trial evidence” (App. at 14), which established 
that Jabateh was a rebel commander during the Liberian civil 
war known as “Jungle Jabbah.” And that evidence also 
demonstrated that, as a rebel commander, Jabateh personally 
committed or ordered his troops to commit murder, 
enslavement, rape, and torture “because of race, religion, 
nationality, ethnic origin or political opinion.” (PSR ¶ 7.) 
Following deliberations, the jury convicted Jabateh on all four 
counts. The District Court later imposed a sentence of 360 
months’ imprisonment, the maximum permitted, along with 
three years’ supervised release, and a special assessment of 
$400.9 Jabateh timely appealed. The District Court had subject 
matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
II.  ANALYSIS 
The horrors recounted at trial, retold only in part here, 
are indescribably tragic. Our role on appeal, however, is to 
review whether the prosecution carried its burden to prove 
 
9 The District Court separately issued a detailed 




beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the crimes charged. 
That the Government did on Counts Three and Four, 
establishing all the elements needed for the jury’s finding of 
perjury under 18 U.S.C. § 1621. And while the text of 18 
U.S.C. § 1546(a) cannot be read to reach the conduct charged 
by the Government in Counts One and Two, that error is not 
plain. Finally, there are no sufficiency or sentencing errors that 
warrant reversal. So we will affirm.   
A. 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) Does Not Encompass Oral 
Statements 
We begin with the charges in Counts One and Two 
alleging that during the 2011 Interview, and while under oath, 
Jabateh orally reaffirmed false answers on his permanent 
resident application.10 Both counts alleged that these false, oral 
statements violated 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) which prohibits a 
particular kind of conduct where a person:  
knowingly makes under oath, or as permitted 
under penalty of perjury under section 1746 of 
title 28, United States Code, knowingly 
subscribes as true, any false statement with 
respect to a material fact in any application, 
affidavit, or other document required by the 
immigration laws or regulations prescribed 
 
10 To repeat, that Jabateh had never “engaged in 
genocide, otherwise ordered, incited, assisted or otherwise 
participated in the killing of any person because of race, 
religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political opinion” (Count 
One), and that he had never procured an immigration benefit 
by fraud or willful misrepresentation of a material fact (Count 




thereunder, or knowingly presents any such 
application, affidavit, or other document which 
contains any such false statement or which fails 
to contain any reasonable basis in law or 
fact. .  .  . 
The Government and Jabateh agree on this much: all 
that is at issue is whether § 1546(a) is best read to reach 
Jabateh’s oral statements during the 2011 Interview. Deciding 
that question turns not on Jabateh’s butchery and debasement 
of innocents illustrated to, and found by, a jury of his peers. 
Rather, no matter how troubling the facts, perhaps, especially 
when so, “our job is to interpret the words consistent with their 
‘ordinary meaning . . . at the time Congress enacted the 
statute.’” Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2067, 
2070 (2018) (alteration in original) (quoting Perrin v. United 
States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)); see also New Prime, Inc. v. 
Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 539 (2019). “After all, only the words 
on the page constitute the law adopted by Congress and 
approved by the President. If judges could add to, remodel, 
update, or detract from old statutory terms inspired only by 
extratextual sources and our own imaginations, we would risk 
amending statutes outside the legislative process[.]” Bostock v. 
Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1738 (2020). Such a result 
would, of course, “deny the people the right to continue relying 
on the original meaning of the law they have counted on to 
settle their rights and obligations.” Id. And “the people” 
protected by our system of laws include both the innocent and 
the guilty. So to interpret the meaning of § 1546(a) in its 




then consider the import of amendments to that text over 
time.11 
 1. The Immigration Act of 1924 
The law codified as § 1546(a) was first enacted as part 
of the Immigration Act of 1924 (“1924 Act”). Immigration Act 
of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, 43 Stat. 153. The relevant 
provision fell within the section entitled “Offenses in 
connection with documents” and originally stated: “Whoever 
knowingly makes under oath any false statement in any 
application, affidavit, or other document required by the 
immigration laws or regulations prescribed thereunder, shall, 
upon conviction thereof, be fined . . . or imprisoned . . . , or 
both.” 1924 Act § 22(c). Our focus is on the term “application,” 
and how that word, as used by Congress, is best construed.  
Start with ordinary usage. As commonly understood 
during that time, “application” meant making a request. See 
 
11 Prior decisions interpreting § 1546(a) provide little 
help. While we considered the meaning of § 1546(a) in United 
States v. Ashurov, our review was limited to the presentment 
clause. 726 F.3d 395 (3d Cir. 2013). The Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in United States v. Chu addressed what constitutes an 
“oath” in the context of § 1546(a), but it did not address 
whether § 1546(a) extends to oral statements. 5 F.3d 1244 (9th 
Cir. 1993). The First Circuit construed § 1546(a) to apply only 
where “the statement was made in an application required by 
the United States immigration laws and regulations.” United 
States v. Boskic, 545 F.3d 69, 85 (1st Cir. 2008). But it did not 
explain its conclusion that § 1546(a) applied to statements in 





Application, Black’s Law Dictionary 78 (2d ed. 1910) (“A 
putting to, placing before, preferring a request or petition to or 
before a person. The act of making a request for something.”); 
H.W. Fowler & F.G. Fowler, The Concise Oxford Dictionary 
of Current English 39 (7th ed. 1919) (defining “application” as 
the “making of a request”); Noah Webster, An American 
Dictionary of the English Language 45 (New York, White & 
Sheffield 1841) (defining “application” as “[t]he act of making 
request, or soliciting”). While “application” standing alone, in 
1924 as now, could refer to an oral request, “[w]idening our 
view to take in” the entire statutory context shows that 
Congress meant a written submission. Henson v. Santander 
Consumer USA Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718, 1722 (2017).  
First, the 1924 Act places “application” in a three-item 
series: “application, affidavit, or other document.” 1924 Act 
§ 22(c). Congress’s use of the phrase “or other document” then 
modifies both “application” and “affidavit” to make them 
similar in scope, as “[w]ords in a list are generally known by 
the company they keep.” Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23, 
31 (2007). As limited, “application” thus refers to a request 
submitted in the form of a document. Beecham v. United 
States, 511 U.S. 368, 371 (1994) (“That several items in a list 
share an attribute counsels in favor of interpreting the other 
items as possessing that attribute as well.”). So while 
“application” might have a “much more expansive sense, that 
isn’t how the term was ordinarily used at the time.” Wis. Cent., 
138 S. Ct. at 2072 (emphasis omitted).12  
 
12 Cases from the period construing “application” in 
other contexts apply the same meaning. See, e.g., N. Assurance 





Second, the section heading of the 1924 Act adds 
clarity, because while “heading[s] cannot substitute for the 
operative text of the statute[,]” they are surely “tools available 
for the resolution of doubt about the meaning of a statute.” Fla. 
Dep’t of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 
47 (2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Congress opted to place the prohibition on “any false statement 
in any application” inside a section titled “Offenses in 
Connection with Documents,” strong evidence that 
“application” referred to a written request or submission. See 
1924 Act § 22. 
 
(1902) (“[H]ere the right is asserted to prove, not only that the 
assured did not make the statements contained in his answers, 
but that he never read the application[.]”) (quoting N.Y. Life 
Ins. Co. v. Fletcher, 117 U.S. 519, 529 (1886)); United States 
v. Poinier, 140 U.S. 160, 162 (1891) (“It would seem from this 
[context] that the ‘applications’ were presumed to be in 
writing[.]”); Rushing v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 224 F. 
74, 75 (8th Cir. 1915) (referring to an application for a life 
insurance policy as a “written application”); U.S. Fid. & Guar. 
Co. v. Egg Shippers’ Strawboard & Filler Co., 148 F. 353, 357 
(8th Cir. 1906) (“It is altogether clear that the written statement 
which the defendant failed to attach to or indorse on the bond 
is an application or representation within the meaning of the 
Iowa statute.”); Carrollton Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Am. Credit 
Indemn. Co. of N.Y., 124 F. 25, 30 (2d Cir. 1903) (“In this case 







Next, we “extend[] our gaze from the narrow statutory 
provision at issue to take in the larger statutory landscape[.]” 
Henson, 137 S. Ct. at 1722. Preceding sections of a statute “are 
integral parts of a whole” and “define the field in which 
Congress was legislating[.]” New Prime, 139 S. Ct. at 538. 
Helpfully, Congress’s reference to an “application” in Section 
22(c) was not its only use of that term in the 1924 Act. Take 
Section 7(a), requiring that “[e]very immigrant applying for an 
immigration visa shall make application therefor in duplicate 
in such form as shall be by regulations prescribed.” 1924 Act 
§ 7(a). None would read a directive to submit duplicate 
applications to mean anything besides written forms. Or 
consider Section 7(f), explaining that “[e]ach copy of the 
application shall be signed by the immigrant in the presence of 
the consular officer and verified by the oath of the immigrant 
administered by the consular officer.” 1924 Act § 7(f). And, by 
cross-reference, including a false statement in a document 
required under Section 7(f) subjected an affiant to prosecution 
under Section 22(c).13 So we follow the “natural presumption 
that identical words used in different parts of the same act are 
intended to have the same meaning.” Atl. Cleaners & Dyers, 
Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932). That means 
Congress used the term “application” consistently to mean a 
written instrument throughout the 1924 Act. 
 
13 Recall that Section 22(c), later codified as 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1546(a), provided “[w]hoever knowingly makes under oath 
any false statement in any application, affidavit, or other 
document required by the immigration laws or regulations 
prescribed thereunder, shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined 




Finally, “contemporaneous usages, customs, and 
practices” during the era “shed light on the meaning of the 
language in question at the time of enactment.” McGirt v. 
Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2468 (2020); see also Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 Harv. 
L. Rev. 417, 417–18 (1899) (describing interpretation as 
asking “what those words would mean in the mouth of a 
normal speaker of English, using them in the circumstances in 
which they were used,” and noting that “it is to the end of 
answering this last question that we let in evidence as to what 
the circumstances were”). Under the 1924 Act, immigrants 
seeking entry into the United States first obtained a visa by 
applying to an American consulate abroad. 1924 Act §§ 2, 7; 
see generally Abram Orlow, Manual on the Immigration Laws 
of the United States 44–45 (B’nai B’rith, 2d ed. 1948) 
(describing the documentation required to prepare visa 
petitions). “The formal application [was] filled out only when 
the [individual] present[ed] himself with his documents and 
evidence.” Sidney Kansas, U.S. Immigration Exclusion and 
Deportation and Citizenship of the United States of America 
21 (2d ed. 1940). Then, “[e]ach copy of the application” was 
“signed by the immigrant in the presence of the consular officer 
and verified by the oath of the immigrant administered by the 
consular officer.” 1924 Act § 7(f). And a fee covered “the 
furnishing and verification of each application, which . . . 
include[d] the furnishing and verification of the duplicate.” Id. 
§ 7(h). Throughout, the focus of the visa process was the 
information in the application, supported by accompanying 
documentation. That ended with a “preexamination . . . 
conducted in the first instance by an immigrant inspector” who 
“shall prepare in duplicate Form I-448, ‘Manifest Data,’ which 
together with the application for preexamination, medical 




documents presented, shall constitute the record in the case.” 8 
C.F.R. § 142.11 (1941). And it was a false statement within 
that “application, affidavit, or other [required] document” that 
could trigger criminal penalty. See, e.g., United States ex rel. 
Fink v. Reimer, 16 F. Supp. 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1936), aff’d, 96 F.2d 
217 (2d Cir. 1938) (Hand, J.) (obtaining a visa as a result of a 
false statement that misrepresented the applicant’s identity 
violated Section 22(c)); see also Kansas, supra, at 65 
(describing Section 22 as addressing “forged, false, or altered 
documents”). 
Taken together, the best reading of “application” in the 
1924 Act means only written statements submitted in 
document form. With that meaning in mind, we turn to 
Congress’s subsequent statutory language that builds on the 
1924 Act.14  
 2. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 
Congress updated Section 1546(a) in the Immigration 
and Nationality Act of 1952 (“1952 Act Amendment”). Pub. 
L. No. 82-414, Title IV, § 402, 66 Stat. 163, 275–76. Among 
other changes, it amended the fourth paragraph of § 1546(a) to 
apply to “[w]hoever knowingly makes under oath any false 
statement with respect to a material fact in any application, 
 
14 In 1948, Congress codified the criminal law of the 
United States into a single part of the United States Code, Title 
18. As a result, Section 22(c) of the 1924 Act moved to the 
fourth paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) without change, and 
with a new name, “Fraud and Misuse of Visas and Permits.” 





affidavit, or other document required by the immigration 
laws.” Id. (emphasis added to text inserted by amendment).  
The parties agree that, at a minimum, the 1952 Act 
Amendment limited prosecutions under § 1546(a) to only 
material false statements, rather than prosecution for any 
passing falsity. But does it do more? The Government says yes, 
and reads the phrase “with respect to” as covering all false 
material statements whether “made orally, regarding the 
written application, as well as in writing.” (Response Br. at 22.) 
Jabateh posits that Congress added “with respect to a material 
fact” only to “clarify that the false statement, to be 
prosecutable, must be material” and not “to have [the] 
substantive broadening effect” of extending § 1546(a) to oral 
statements. (Opening Br. at 28.) As with the 1924 Act, our 
answer turns on the best reading of “the particular statutory 
language at issue, as well as the language and design of the 
statute as a whole.” K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 
281, 291 (1988); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garner, 
Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 167 (2012) 
(explaining that under the whole-text canon “[i]t is the most 
natural and genuine exposition of a statute to construe one part 
of the statute by another part of the same statute”).  
First, consider Section 287 of the 1952 Act granting 
certain select immigration officers the authority to administer 
oaths. It also added that “any person to whom such oath has 
been administered . . . who shall knowingly or willfully give 
false evidence or swear to any false statement concerning any 
matter referred to in this subsection shall be guilty of perjury” 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1621. 1952 Act § 287(b).15 Section 1621 is 
 
15 This provision is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1357(b), and 




the general perjury statute applicable not just to immigration 
proceedings, but “in any case in which a law of the United 
States authorizes an oath to be administered[.]” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1621(1). So false statements made under oath to immigration 
officers, including oral statements, may be subject to 
prosecution for perjury. And there was little point to Congress 
adding that authority if, as the Government contends, oral 
misstatements were already prohibited under § 1546(a). To the 
contrary, “[w]e usually ‘presume differences in language like 
this convey differences in meaning.’” Wis. Cent., 138 S. Ct. at 
2071 (quoting Henson, 137 S. Ct. at 1723). “And that 
presumption must bear particular strength when the same 
Congress passed both statutes to handle much the same task.” 
Id. at 2071–72. Following that interpretive path, the best 
reading of 1952 Act Amendment is that material, false 
statements made under oath are chargeable under § 1546(a) 
only if made in a document, while oral statements about those 
same documents are chargeable as perjury under § 1621. 
Indeed, “[m]ore confirmation yet comes from a neighboring 
term in the statutory text.” New Prime, 139 S. Ct. at 540. 
Because looking directly to § 1621 shows that Congress knew 
how to make a criminal statute applicable to both oral and 
written statements.16   
 
16 This was equally true of the version of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1621 before the 1952 Act:  
 
Whoever, having taken an oath before a 
competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any 
case in which a law of the United States 





Confirmation comes also from the amended section 
heading of the 1952 Act, renamed with an eye toward 
documents: “Fraud and misuse of visas, permits, and other 
entry documents.” 1952 Act § 402. See Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, 
554 U.S. at 47. This amendment demonstrates Congress’s 
chosen language focuses on documents, and not oral 
statements. See Bedroc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 
(2004) (“The preeminent canon of statutory interpretation 
requires us to presume that [the] legislature says in a statute 
what it means and means in a statute what it says there.”) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).   
Short of re-writing Congress’s work, § 1546(a) is not 
naturally read to apply to oral statements. Indeed, any other 
reading, including the broad interpretation posited by the 
Government, is “unmoor[ed]” from the text and “opens the 
door to a world of disquieting consequences—which we would 
need far stronger textual support to believe Congress 




will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or 
that any written testimony, declaration, 
deposition, or certificate by him subscribed, is 
true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or 
subscribes any material matter which he does not 
believe to be true, is guilty of perjury[.] 
 





3. The 1976 Amendment and Statements Made 
“Under Penalty of Perjury” 
The Government offers an alternative argument that 
requires still more history. Recall that before 1976 the 
language of § 1546(a) applied only to false statements made 
“under oath” because, at that time, administrative necessity 
required applicants to appear in person to sign documents 
under oath.17 In 1976, Congress again amended § 1546(a) to 
add an option to sign documents “under penalty of perjury.” 
Pub. L. No. 94-550, 90 Stat. 2534, 2535 (1976) (“1976 
Amendment”). The 1976 Amendment changed § 1546(a) “by 
inserting immediately after ‘under oath’ the following: ‘, or as 
permitted under penalty of perjury under section 1746 of title 
28, United States Code, knowingly subscribes as true[.]’” Id. 
This, the Government argues, served to “make clear that the 
offense extends to [an oral] false statement under oath as well 
as in writing.” (Response Br. at 23.)  
Clear it is not. For one thing, new language added to a 
statute ordinarily ought not be read to alter the meaning of the 
statute’s existing and unchanged text. Scalia & Garner, supra 
at 78 (explaining that under the fixed-meaning canon “[w]ords 
must be given the meaning they had when the text was 
adopted”).18 “After all, if judges could freely invest old 
 
17 See, e.g., Kansas, supra, at 21 (“The formal 
application is filled out only when the alien presents himself 
[to the Consulate] with his documents and evidence.”).  
18 The Government suggests that we look to legislative 
history for support (Govt. Supp. Br. at 15–16), but doing so 
“would risk failing to take account of legislative compromises 





statutory terms with new meanings, we would risk amending 
legislation outside the single, finely wrought and exhaustively 
considered, procedure the Constitution commands.” New 
Prime, 139 S. Ct. at 539 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). So while the 1976 Amendment added a new, 
alternative method for attestation, nothing suggests that we are 
free to change the ordinary understanding of the untouched 
portion of the text. 
The Government responds to all of this with necessity, 
urging an atextual reading of § 1546(a) that reaches oral 
statements because to hold otherwise “would permit a 
defendant to escape Section 1546(a) culpability for lying under 
oath to immigration officials about the contents of required 
immigration documents,” which the Government characterizes 
as a “perverted result” that “should be avoided.” (Response Br. 
at 21.) That plea deserves a response.  
First, “[i]t is not our role to second-guess Congress’ 
decision,” or reimagine its words as we think appropriate. 
Rotkiske v. Klemm, 140 S. Ct. 355, 361 (2019). Lest we forget, 
“[t]he place to make new legislation, or address unwanted 
consequences of old legislation, lies in Congress.” Bostock, 
140 S. Ct. at 1753. And that is for reasons as old as our nation: 
“Congress alone has the institutional competence, democratic 
legitimacy, and (most importantly) constitutional authority to 
revise statutes[.]” Wis. Cent., 138 S. Ct. at 2074. Second, the 
 
than honor the effectuation of congressional intent.” New 
Prime, 139 S. Ct. at 543 (internal quotation marks and 
alterations omitted). So we “must presume that a legislature 
says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it 





Government asks for an interpretation of § 1546(a) so novel 
that it concedes it is aware of no decision of any court applying 
the meaning it seeks. (See Oral Arg. Tr. at 32.) That is more 
likely explained by the natural reading of the statute than 
coincidence.  
Finally, what, precisely, is “perverted” about a result 
that holds one branch of the Government to the limits imposed 
by another equal branch? Not the egregious facts of this case. 
None, including the jury that weighed impartially the mountain 
of evidence marshalled against Jabateh, would view his 
conduct as anything less than monstrous. But none, including 
the Government, can argue that glancing away from the limited 
authority given by the people will produce a sounder, fairer, 
and stronger union. To the contrary, “all powers of 
government, legislative, executive and judicial alike, can be 
abused or perverted.” Jones v. City of Opelika, 319 U.S. 105, 
137 (1943) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting). It is our job, under 
Article III of the Constitution, to enforce that solemn duty in 
cases both easy and hard, filled with facts both bland and 
nauseating.   
For all these reasons, the text, context, and history of 
§ 1546(a) show that the best reading of the statute applies only 
to material, false statements made in a document under oath or 
under penalty of perjury, not false statements made orally 
under oath about that document. See Kansas v. Garcia, 140 S. 
Ct. 791, 803 (2020) (describing the conduct outlined in § 1546 
as “immigration-document fraud”).19 
 
19 In supplemental briefing, the Government argues for 





B. Reviewing Jabateh’s Convictions Under § 1546(a) 
For Plain Error  
 Having reached the best ordinary reading of § 1546(a), 
we consider whether Jabateh’s convictions under Counts One 
and Two may stand. Recall that Jabateh did not raise this issue 
before the District Court. As a result, our review is defined by 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), and we may only 
reverse if the erroneous interpretation of § 1546(a) is “plain.” 
United States v. Payano, 930 F.3d 186, 192 (3d Cir. 2019) 
(quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)). 
And under well-established principles, the error here is not. 
 1. The Doctrine of Plain Error 
 We ground our analysis in history. The plain error 
doctrine allows courts to notice and correct, at their discretion, 
 
does not stand based on his oral statements, he is still 
“‘punishable as a principal’ under 18 U.S.C. § 2(b)” because 
he “caused” an immigration officer “to make the answers on 
his behalf on the document.” (Govt. Supp. Br. at 7.) Section 
2(b) provides “[w]hoever willfully causes an act to be done 
which if directly performed by him or another would be an 
offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal.” 
18 U.S.C. § 2(b). But the Supreme Court has cautioned that 
“[t]o uphold a conviction on a charge that was neither alleged 
in an indictment nor presented to a jury at trial offends the most 
basic notions of due process.” Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 
100, 106 (1979). Even if the evidence is clear that Jabateh 
caused an immigration officer to include false answers in the 
immigration form, as the Government now contends, it is long 





errors raised for the first time on appeal. The Supreme Court 
has long recognized judicial authority to address “a plain error 
[that] was committed in a matter so absolutely vital to 
defendants[.]” Wiborg v. United States, 163 U.S. 632, 658 
(1896); see also Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 221–22 
(1905). In United States v. Atkinson, the Supreme Court 
clarified that the doctrine protects the integrity of judicial 
proceedings where an unnoticed error threatens to “seriously 
affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings.” United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 
(1936). Less than a decade later, Rule 52(b) codified 
Atkinson’s definition of plain error. See Advisory Committee 
Notes on Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 52; accord Olano, 507 U.S. at 
736. 
 Olano articulated the four-prong inquiry for analyzing 
errors under Rule 52(b) and the plain error doctrine. Courts 
may provide remedies only if (1) there is an “error[,]” (2) the 
error is “plain[,]” and (3) the plain error “affect[s] substantial 
rights.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 732–34; see also Johnson v. United 
States, 520 U.S. 461, 466–67 (1997). Meeting all three allows 
a court to “correct a plain forfeited error affecting substantial 
rights if the error ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or 
public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Olano, 507 U.S. at 
736 (citing Atkinson, 297 U.S. at 160). Still, “Rule 52(b) is 
permissive, not mandatory.” Id. at 735. And the result is a high 
bar for reversing plain errors because a “plain error affecting 
substantial rights does not, without more, satisfy the Atkinson 
standard, for otherwise the discretion afforded by Rule 52(b) 
would be illusory.” Id. at 736–37.  
 Here, our interpretation of § 1546(a) does not meet the 




decisions, the issue is not sufficiently “plain” to warrant 
reversal. 
2. Defining What Errors are “Plain” Under Rule 
52(b) 
 The term “‘[p]lain’ is synonymous with ‘clear’ or, 
equivalently, ‘obvious.’” Id. at 734 (citations omitted). While 
courts sometimes speak of statutes as either “clear” or 
“ambiguous,” the fault lines among possible meanings are 
rarely so sharp. That is why, whatever the label, “‘a reviewing 
court employs all of the traditional tools of construction’” to 
“‘reach a conclusion about the best interpretation,’ thereby 
resolving any perceived ambiguity.” Shular v. United States, 
140 S. Ct. 779, 788 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) 
(quoting Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2448 (2019) 
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring in judgment)). While that task is 
not difficult, the process of interpretation may require more or 
less rummaging in the “toolbox” to “seiz[e] everything from 
which aid can be derived[.]” Ocasio v. United States, 136 S. 
Ct. 1423, 1434 n.8 (2016) (quoting Muscarello v. United 
States, 524 U.S. 125, 138–39 (1998)). And the deeper that 
interpretive inquiry, the less obvious, at least at the outset, the 
answer.  
It is generally true that “lack of precedent alone will not 
prevent us from finding plain error.” United States v. Stinson, 
734 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2013); see, e.g., United States v. 
Benjamin, 711 F.3d 371, 379 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Although the 
continuing nature of the conduct criminalized by the . . . statute 
is a matter of first impression for this Court, we hold that the 
District Court's error was plain.”); see also United States v. 
Seals, 813 F.3d 1038, 1047 (7th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he fact that 




does not mean that such a conclusion is never warranted.”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). But for relief under the 
stringent Olano standard, novel questions still must be capable 
of measurement against “some other ‘absolutely clear’ legal 
norm[.]” United States v. Nwoye, 663 F.3d 460, 466 (D.C. Cir. 
2011); see also Henderson v. United States, 568 U.S. 266, 275 
(2013) (“[W]hether the law of [a] circuit initially was unclear 
. . . . [is] likely to be particularly difficult to resolve where what 
is at issue is a matter of legal degree, not kind.”); Gov’t of the 
V.I. v. Vanterpool, 767 F.3d 157, 163 (3d Cir. 2014); United 
States v. Seighman, 966 F.3d 237, 244 (3d Cir. 2020).  
3. Jabateh’s Novel Argument does not Produce 
Plain Error 
 Taken together, the novel question of whether § 1546(a) 
is best read to include oral statements is not an interpretative 
exercise that falls within the exacting limits of Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 52(b). First, it cannot be said that 
the meaning of § 1546(a) was “clear” as we normally 
understand clarity in legal interpretation, for the meaning of 
§ 1546(a) was unsettled both at Jabateh’s trial and throughout 
this appeal. Henderson, 568 U.S. at 275; see also United States 
v. Terrell, 696 F.3d 1257, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (noting that, 
in plain error review, “‘plain’ simply means ‘clear’”) (citation 
omitted). Second, as all parties agree, there is no instance of 
any other court considering the ordinary meaning of § 1546(a). 
Vanterpool, 767 F.3d at 163. Nor is there any controlling or 
persuasively clear “legal norm” on the meaning of the 
provision. Stinson, 734 F.3d at 184; Nwoye, 663 F.3d at 466.  
At bottom, Jabateh’s challenge presents a new issue of 
interpretation, where only a close interpretative inquiry reveals 




of Federal Rule 52(b), is not a clear, plain error. We do not 
doubt that “[f]ew constitutional principles are more firmly 
established than a defendant’s right to be heard on the specific 
charges of which he is accused.” Dunn v. United States, 442 
U.S. 100, 106 (1979). But the limits on our review prescribed 
by the Supreme Court in Rule 52(b) under the authority 
provided by Congress in the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2072, bind our review. As a result, we cannot disturb 
Jabateh’s conviction.20  
C. Ample Evidence Supports Jabateh’s Convictions 
Under 18 U.S.C. § 1621 
Jabateh argues that his perjury convictions should also 
be reversed because the evidence submitted at trial failed to 
prove a false statement. Again, as Jabateh failed to move for a 
judgment of acquittal based on the insufficiency of the 
evidence, we review his claim for plain error. United States v. 
Gordon, 290 F.3d 539, 547 (3d Cir. 2002). We thus “review 
the argument only for a manifest miscarriage of justice—the 
record must be devoid of evidence of guilt or the evidence must 
be so tenuous that a conviction is shocking.” United States v. 
Burnett, 773 F.3d 122, 135 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). “Such an error requires a 
 
20 Jabateh asks this Court to employ the “rule of lenity” 
to find in his favor “if there were some doubt about the 
meaning” of § 1546. (Opening Br. at 29.) Having arrived at the 
best ordinary meaning of the statute, we find that the rule of 
lenity has no application here. See United States v. Johnman, 
948 F.3d 612, 620 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that the rule of lenity 
“may be applied only where we are left with ‘grievous 
ambiguity’ after applying all other traditional tools of statutory 




defendant to establish that the trial judge and prosecutor were 
derelict in even permitting the jury to deliberate.” Id. So “the 
relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 
(1979) (emphasis in original).   
Counts Three and Four charged Jabateh with perjury in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1621(1). As usual, the text governs. 
Section 1621(1) provides that an individual is guilty of perjury 
if, after “tak[ing] an oath before a competent tribunal [or] 
officer . . . that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, 
or that any written testimony, declaration, deposition, or 
certificate by him subscribed, is true,” the individual “willfully 
and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material 
matter which he does not believe to be true[.]” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1621(1). Distilled to its elements, the Government must show 
that Jabateh 1) willfully 2) made a false statement 3) under 
oath 4) before a tribunal or officer 5) about a material matter. 
See United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993). The 
record shows that the Government amply carried its burden. 
1.  Count Three 
Form I-485, Application to Register Permanent 
Resident or Adjust Status, asked Jabateh whether he had “ever 
engaged in genocide, or otherwise ordered, incited, assisted or 
otherwise participated in the killing of any person because of 
race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political opinion[.]” 
(App. at 84.) Jabateh responded “No” on the form. (App. at 
84.) Count Three charged that Jabateh committed perjury in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1621 during his 2011 Interview when, 




Jabateh argues that the Government never established that 
these killings occurred “because of race, religion, nationality, 
ethnic origin or political opinion.” (Opening Br. at 30–31.) The 
evidence presented tells a different story.  
To start, witnesses recounted in graphic detail the 
rampant violence perpetrated by Jabateh, personally or under 
his orders, for factional political affiliation. Hawa Gonoie 
testified that at just thirteen years old she witnessed Jabateh 
order his men to kill and mutilate a suspected spy. Janghai 
Barclay testified that she watched Jabateh declare a captured 
young man a traitor with no more than a glance and order his 
execution. Kafumba Konneh testified that he watched Jabateh 
order executions of suspected spies and NPFL prisoners of war 
more than once.  
 Or take the evidence that Jabateh and his fighters 
targeted victims solely based on ethnic and religious 
differences. After the ULIMO split along tribal lines, with 
Mandingo fighters forming ULIMO-K and Krahn fighters 
forming ULIMO-J, Jabateh and his ULIMO-K fighters 
targeted, tortured, and killed members of the Krahn tribe. 
Martha Togba testified that she observed Mandingo ULIMO-
K fighters disarming non-Mandingo fighters at Zero Guard 
Post while chanting and wearing headbands proclaiming “No 
more Jesus, only Allah.” (App. at 450.) A few days later, 
Jabateh brutally beat, shot, stabbed, and killed Ms. Togba’s 
pregnant sister, Tina, and left her body in the street to rot; all 
because she was in a relationship with a Krahn ULIMO-J 
commander.  
Candidly, Jabateh does not deny his role in these 
atrocities. Instead, he argues his actions resulted from “a 




civil war seemingly waged without rules or restraint.” 
(Opening Br. at 31.) Even if “there were no clean hands” in the 
Liberian civil war (App. at 619), and even if multiple factions 
committed religiously, ethnically or politically motivated 
violence, they are of no possible relevance to Jabateh’s 
convictions. There was sufficient evidence presented for a 
rational trier of fact to have found that Jabateh committed 
perjury.  
2.  Jabateh Gained Immigration Benefits by Fraud 
or Willful Misrepresentation 
Remember that during the 2011 Interview immigration 
officials asked Jabateh whether he had, “by fraud or willful 
misrepresentation of material fact, ever sought to procure, or 
procured, a visa, other documentation, entry into the U.S., or 
any immigration benefit,” a question identical to that shown on 
his Form I-485. (App. at 84, 637.) Jabateh orally reaffirmed 
that his response was “no.” That, says the Government in 
Count Four of the indictment, is perjury in violation of § 1621 
because Jabateh gained asylum by lying in his Asylum 
Application and again during 1999 Interview. That is correct. 
Begin with Jabateh’s submissions in support of his 
application for asylum. In his attached personal statement, 
Jabateh stated that between 1992 and 1995 he served as an 
“intelligence officer” and later as a “security section liaison” 
with the ULIMO. (App. at 144–45.) The evidence shows 
otherwise, with several witnesses testifying that Jabateh never 
served in security, but as a commander and an active combatant 
in the ULIMO-K.   
Jabateh argues that his “inadequately detailed personal 




information” and insufficient to establish fraud or willful 
misrepresentation. (Opening Br. at 34–35.) But this is no 
simple oversight or innocuous omission. He not only failed to 
disclose his role as a combatant, he affirmatively 
misrepresented the scope of that role. Jabateh painted himself 
as a peaceful figure that actively “protect[ed] Mandingo and 
Krahn people from being murdered and massacred” and 
assisted with United Nations and ECOMOG disarmament 
efforts. (App. at 144–45.) The testimony of seventeen 
witnesses to his violence brought forth the truth. These 
misrepresentations no doubt led Jabateh to be granted asylum. 
Nancy Vanlue, the asylum officer who conducted the 1999 
Interview, testified that, had she known Jabateh misrepresented 
his positions in ULIMO, he would have been barred from 
obtaining asylum as a persecutor.   
And Jabateh’s misrepresentations did not end with his 
asylum application and personal statement. In the 1999 
Interview, he denied having “ever committed a crime” or even 
“harm[ing] anyone else.” (App. at 74, 166, 570–71.) Jabateh 
now claims on appeal that these questions “are too vague and 
ambiguous to support a conviction.” (Opening Br. at 37 
(quoting App. at 74).)  Yet “[c]hallenges to the clarity of a 
question” that arise in perjury cases, such as the challenge 
raised by Jabateh, “are typically left to the jury, which has the 
responsibility of determining whether the defendant 
understood the question to be confusing or subject to many 
interpretations.” United States v. Hird, 913 F.3d 332, 346 (3d 
Cir. 2019). That means we “will not disturb a jury’s 
determination that a response under oath constitutes perjury 
unless it is entirely unreasonable to expect that the defendant 
understood the question posed to him.” Id. (internal quotation 




glaring instances of vagueness or double-speak by the 
examiner at the time of questioning (rather than artful post-hoc 
interpretations of the questions) that—by the lights of any 
reasonable fact-finder—would mislead or confuse a witness 
into making a response that later becomes the basis of a perjury 
conviction.” Id. at 347–48. 
That standard makes quick work of this claim. For it 
was not “entirely unreasonable” for the jury to have expected 
Jabateh to have understood these simple questions. Id. at 346. 
Vanlue’s testimony, for example, shows that Jabateh 
understood what it means to commit a crime or cause harm. 
Vanlue recalled that during his asylum interview Jabateh 
described being beaten, and his wife raped, because of his 
Mandingo tribal affiliation. Gallingly, he cited these acts as the 
basis for his asylum claim. The jury could conclude Jabateh 
knew right from wrong. Likewise, as already painfully 
recounted, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for a 
rational finding that Jabateh’s entire military career was 
defined by violent crime.   
Logically, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to 
find that Jabateh gained asylum by lying about his crimes. And 
from there it is a small step to conclude that Jabateh perjured 
himself during his 2011 Interview by affirming under oath 
statements “which he d[id] not believe to be true.” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1621(1). For all those reasons, we find no plain error in 






D. The District Court was Not Required to Merge 
Jabateh’s Immigration Fraud and Perjury 
Convictions  
For the first time on appeal, Jabateh argues that Counts 
One and Three charged the “same offense.” Likewise, Counts 
Two and Four. We disagree. “The applicable rule is that, where 
the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two 
distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine 
whether there are two offenses[,] or only one, is whether each 
provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” 
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932); see 
also United States v. Miller, 527 F.3d 54, 71 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(applying Blockburger’s “same-elements” test). 
To prove a violation of § 1546(a), the Government 
needed to show that Jabateh 1) “knowingly” 2) “under oath” 
3) made “any false statement” 4) “with respect to a material 
fact” 5) in a “document required by the immigration laws or 
regulations.” 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a). By contrast, to prove a 
violation of § 1621(1), the Government needed to establish that 
Jabateh 1) “willfully” 2) made a false statement 3) under oath 
4) before a tribunal or officer 5) about “any material matter.” 
18 U.S.C. § 1621(1). 
Comparing these two statutes reveals at least two key 
differences. First, § 1546(a) requires proof that the “false 
statement” was in a “document required by the immigration 
laws or regulations.” Section 1621(1) contains no such 
element. Second, § 1546(a) and § 1621(1) require different 
states of mind. Section 1546(a) requires proof of a 
“knowingly” false statement, while § 1621(1) requires proof 
the defendant acted “willfully.” Cf. United States v. Sherman, 




“a reduced mens rea” as compared to “willfully”) (emphasis 
omitted); United States v. Gross, 511 F.2d 910, 914–15 (3d Cir. 
1975) (“Congress chose to provide different mens rea 
elements: Unlike the general perjury statute, § 1623 requires 
that a false statement be made ‘knowingly,’ rather than 
‘willfully.’”). As each statute requires the Government to 
establish at least one element that is not required by the other 
statute, there is no plain error in declining to merge the counts. 
E. Jabateh’s Consecutive Sentence is not Plain Error  
Jabateh challenges his thirty-year aggregate sentence, 
arguing that the District Court’s 26-level departure and 
imposition of the maximum sentence on each count running 
consecutively was procedurally unreasonable. Once again, as 
Jabateh failed to raise his objections before the District Court, 
we review the procedural reasonableness of his sentence for 
plain error.21 Holguin-Hernandez v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 
762, 764 (2020) (“Errors ‘not brought to the court’s attention’ 
. . . are subject to review only insofar as they are ‘plain.’”) 
(quoting Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 52(b)). He does not meet that 
rigorous test. 
We have explained that “District Courts engage in a 
three step process when imposing a sentence, the first being 
that the defendant’s guideline range is calculated.” United 
States v. Stevenson, 832 F.3d 412, 431 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal 
 
21 Although Jabateh first argued we review his sentence 
for an abuse of discretion (Opening Br. at 46), he conceded at 
oral argument that he was “up against plain error” (Oral Arg. 
Tr. at 52). We agree with that revised position, as Jabateh has 
not pointed to where he objected to an above-Guidelines 




quotation marks and citation omitted). And “[t]he [District] 
Court [is] required to make this determination before moving 
on to consider any departure motions (step two) and the 
§ 3553(a) factors (step three)[.]” Id. Jabateh argues that the 
District Court committed procedural errors by 1) imposing an 
unjustified upward departure; 2) imposing consecutive 
sentences; and 3) basing Jabateh’s sentence on a material 
misapprehension of fact.  
1.   The District Court’s Upward Departure or 
Variance 
The District Court departed 26 levels to impose a total 
sentence of 360 months, comprising consecutively-running 
sentences of 120 months’ imprisonment on each of Counts One 
and Two (violations of § 1546(a)) and sixty months’ 
imprisonment on each of Counts Three and Four (violations of 
§ 1621).22 That represented the statutory maximum for each 
count of conviction. The District Court based its sentence on 
two alternative grounds: 1) “an upward departure because of 
the seriousness of [Jabateh’s] immigration offenses, pursuant 
 
22 Jabateh does not challenge the District Court’s initial 
calculation of the advisory Guideline range of fifteen months’ 
to twenty-one months’ imprisonment. Rather, he challenges 
the 26-level upward departure, which led to an adjusted 
Guidelines range of 292 to 365 months’ imprisonment. (App. 
at 11.) The District Court then imposed the combined statutory 
maximum of 360 months for all four counts. (App. at 11.) See 
18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) (statutory maximum of ten years for the 
first and second offense under this section); 18 U.S.C. § 1621 




to Guidelines § 5K2.0”; and 2) “an upward variance from the 
Guidelines, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553[.]” (App. at 26–27.)  
Under § 5K2.0, a “sentencing court may depart from the 
applicable guideline range if . . . the court finds, pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), that there exists an aggravating or 
mitigating circumstance[.]” U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0(a)(1). The 
District Court calculated the initial Guidelines range using the 
2010 Sentencing Guidelines, which did “not take into 
consideration the significant aggravating circumstances—the 
serious human rights offenses—the defendant concealed when 
he committed the instant offense[s].” (PSR ¶ 108.)     
As the District Court’s exhaustive sentencing 
memorandum explained, Jabateh’s “criminal actions f[e]ll well 
outside the heartland of all Guidelines provisions related to 
immigration fraud and perjury.” (App. at 35; see also PSR 
¶¶ 108, 110 (observing that “[a]fter considering the history and 
characteristics of the defendant, the Court may consider a 
sentence outside the advisory guideline system”).) Although 
the District Court addressed and considered Jabateh’s conduct 
in Liberia, the sentence was ultimately based on the 
seriousness of his lies and their effect on the asylum and 
immigration process. As to Jabateh’s immigration fraud, the 
District Court reasoned that “[i]n lying to INS about his crimes 
and seeking sanctuary as a persecuted refugee, [Jabateh] stood 
the persecutor bar and, indeed, the asylum system itself, on its 
head.” (App. at 33.) And as to perjury, the District Court 
emphasized that the “heartland of Guidelines § 2J1.3 is far 
removed from the kind of perjury [Jabateh] committed here: 
perjury that undermines the foundations of our immigration 




These conclusions are neither irrational nor novel. To 
the contrary, they mirror decisions in similar cases imposing 
statutory maximum sentences for similar offenses. See, e.g., 
United States v. Munyenyezi, 781 F.3d 532 (1st Cir. 2015) 
(affirming concurrent, statutory-maximum sentences for 
immigration fraud convictions arising from defendant’s 
concealment of her role in the Rwandan genocide); United 
States v. Worku, 800 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2015) (affirming 
significant upward departure and 22-year sentence for 
immigration fraud conviction arising from concealment of 
defendant’s human rights abuses in Ethiopia). For those 
reasons, there is no plain error. The Court’s sentencing 
memorandum leaves no doubt that its rationale for Jabateh’s 
substantive sentence, and for running the sentences 
consecutively, are the same. United States v. Cochrane, 702 
F.3d 334, 346 (6th Cir. 2012). 
2.  The Imposition of Consecutive Sentences 
“Judges have long been understood to have discretion 
to select whether the sentences they impose will run 
concurrently or consecutively with respect to [the] sentences 
that they impose[.]” Setser v. United States, 566 U.S. 231, 236 
(2012); accord United States v. Payano, 930 F.3d 186, 194 n.7 
(3d Cir. 2019). To exercise this discretion, a district court, “in 
determining whether the terms imposed are to be ordered to 
run concurrently or consecutively, shall consider, as to each 
offense for which a term of imprisonment is being imposed, 
the factors set forth in section 3553(a).” 18 U.S.C. § 3584. 
Here, the District Court appropriately weighed the factors set 
forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  
While the Guidelines advise that “[a]ll counts involving 




U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2, they readily acknowledge a district court’s 
authority to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences, 
U.S.S.G. §§ 5G1.2(d), 5G1.3(b). “If the sentence imposed on 
the count carrying the highest statutory maximum is less than 
the total punishment, then the sentence imposed on one or more 
of the other counts shall run consecutively, but only to the 
extent necessary to produce a combined sentence equal to the 
total punishment.” U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(d). This was case here. 
Consecutive sentences implemented the District Court’s 
adjusted Guidelines range of 292 to 365 months’ 
imprisonment, reduced to the statutory maximum of 360 
months. Given the latitude afforded to sentencing courts to 
select concurrent or consecutive sentences, and the Guidelines’ 
directive that sentences “shall run consecutively to produce a 
combined sentence equal to the total punishment,” U.S.S.G. 
§ 5G1.2(d), the sentences here are not plainly erroneous. 
3. The Sentence was Not Based on a Material 
Misapprehension of Fact 
 Finally, Jabateh argues that his sentence must be 
vacated because the District Court stated Jabateh had 
committed or participated in genocide.23 But the Court did not 
 
23 A defendant is guilty of “genocide” when, 
 
with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in 
substantial part, a national, ethnic, racial, or 
religious group . . . (1) kills members of that 
group; (2) causes serious bodily injury to 
members of that group; (3) causes the permanent 
impairment of the mental faculties of members 





justify the sentence based on the possible legal significance of 
Jabateh’s actions. Rather, the sentence stemmed from “the 
egregiousness of [Jabateh’s] lies and their effect on our 
immigration system,” and the fact that the “lies allowed [him] 
to impugn the integrity of our asylum process for almost 
twenty years.” (App. at 38.) Over and over, the District Court 
explained its decision hinged on the gravity of Jabateh’s 
concealment of his “commission of every conceivable war 
crime” and “countless human rights offenses.” (App. at 32; 
App. at 28 (“I thus imposed an upward departure because of 
the seriousness of Defendant’s lies, separate and apart from 
the horror of the crimes themselves.”) (emphasis added).) So 
there is no plain error in considering Jabateh’s participation in 
genocidal acts, among the multitude of human rights atrocities 
established in the record, to fashion a reasonable sentence.24  
 
techniques; (4) subjects the group to conditions 
of life that are intended to cause the physical 
destruction of the group in whole or in part; (5) 
imposes measures intended to prevent births 
within the group; or (6) transfers by force the 
children of the group to another group[.] 
 
18 U.S.C. § 1091(a).  
24 Even assuming the District Court considered 
Jabateh’s role in genocide, there would be no misapprehension 
of fact constituting plain error. (See App. at 14–24, 26, 32 
(noting efforts to “eliminate Krahn rivals”), 1391–93, 1394 
(“The trial has overwhelmingly showed that the defendant 
committed these acts purely, purely because of ethnic enmity, 





III.  CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, we will affirm Jabateh’s 
conviction and sentence.  
 
his role in both genocide and “the killing of any person because 
of race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political opinion” 
were gravely false. (App. at 75.) 
